The idea is simple and powerful: under certain constitutional rules, the Assembleia da República (Parliament) can — by a super-majority (two-thirds) — “confirm” a law or part of a law even if the Constitutional Court declares it unconstitutional. On paper, that gives the legislature a direct way to keep controversial measures alive.
But reality tells a different story: such overrides have been used only very rarely. And even when possible, doing so carries high political and ethical risk.
As we stand in 2025, with heated debates over immigration and nationality law reforms, it makes sense to ask: could Parliament use that power now — and should it?
The Portuguese Constitution includes a mechanism for “confirmation” after a declaration of unconstitutionality. If a law is struck down by the TC, the legislature may repass it with a two-thirds majority, rendering the Court’s ruling ineffective for that law.
In theory, this creates a balance between judicial review and democratic will — a path for Parliament to assert sovereignty in exceptional cases, even against prior court rulings.
But looking at four decades of democratic legislation and constitutional jurisprudence in Portugal, actual use of that path is vanishingly rare. According to constitutional law scholars summarizing the 42-year history of the TC, the “parliamentary prerogative” of reconfirmation has been invoked only twice.
In almost every other case, when the Court struck down a law or part of it, Parliament preferred to amend the problematic pieces — or to abandon the attempt entirely — rather than forcing a constitutional showdown.
Even when entire controversial laws were invalidated — such as recent provisions of the “foreigners law” (2025) — the pattern has been to rework the law to accommodate the Court’s objections, not to reconfirm and override.
In practical terms: the constitutional override remains more theoretical than actual.
Why Use Is Rare — And What It Takes
Legal-Technical Barriers
- The two-thirds majority is high, and you need absolute unity of all supporting parties — any defection kills the plan.
- Constitutional override applies only to laws already declared unconstitutional, after full review. That means a waiting period and uncertainty.
Political & Ethical Cost
- Using override signals that Parliament is willing to bypass constitutional safeguards, risking institutional trust and democratic legitimacy.
- It draws widespread media and public attention, potentially damaging the government’s image internally and internationally.
Institutional Norms & Precedent
- Portuguese legislative culture — so far — has deferred to the TC when key rights and guarantees are at stake.
- Overriding a Court decision would break a decades-long informal norm of respect for constitutional review.
Because of these costs and risks, even when majorities were available, Parliament usually chose compromise — not confrontation.
Given 2025’s Context: What Are the Chances They Try It Now?
That depends on several variables — some pointing to possibility, others dampening it.
What Favors an Attempt
- The current majority reportedly includes enough deputies to meet the two-thirds threshold.
- The subject matter — nationality and immigration — is deeply political and emotionally charged; supporters may view override as necessary to push through reforms.
- There is urgency and public pressure (real or manufactured) to act fast on reforms.
What Speaks Against It
- Multiple recent cases (e.g. 2025 foreigners law) show that when the TC strikes down provisions, the government chooses to revise, not override.
- Overriding would likely provoke strong opposition from civil society, media, and may erode Portugal’s constitutional reputation internally and in the EU.
- Among political parties, internal dissent or fear of long-term backlash may cause defections — making the two-thirds majority harder to keep stable.
- Historically, override has been used only twice — which suggests that even among lawmakers, the taboo remains real.
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